CHAPTER ELEVEN
The Rail Transport Division Of Rolls-Royce
Sons of Fell
A rare picture of DHP1, hauling twelve empty goods wagons on the old Leek-Uttoxeter line, part of which now forms the Churnet Valley railway. Although she performed perfectly to specification at the end of trials rectifications, DHP1 only covered a few hundred miles in her short life and never travelled more than about 25 miles from home.
In 1958, Rudston was 66. It was around this time that he told me that he had given all his 10100 patents to Rolls-Royce, without actually telling me why. At the time, I thought him crazy. In fact, like everything else he did, there was a very good reason for the gift.
One Rolls Royce post war diversification had been into high speed diesel engines in the power range 120 to 450 hp, the power range that had always had potential for the implementation of Rudston's ideas for locomotives with mechanical transmission. Also, Rolls-Royce had already worked with British Railways, and had supplied the power equipment for a Derby-built experimental rail car. Arthur Robotham, who headed the Rolls-Royce oil engine division at Sinfin, was a car and engine specialist who prior to the war had worked on rationalised petrol engines for a range of new cars that were never put into production. This experience, combined with his work as Chief Engineer Tanks for part of the second world war, gave him the credibility needed to persuade Rolls-Royce to develop the "B" range of diesel engines that became the standard power units for wheeled combat vehicles for the MOD. Robotham had been impressed by the lengths American manufacturers had gone to reduce the weights of trucks and suggested the idea of designing lightweight diesel engines in light alloy, a material that RR used extensively in its aero engines. Hives appeared to take little interest in the idea until Vickers, who at that time were developing the Viscount with the RR Dart, decided to develop a range of tractors and needed an engine. And so the Oil Engine Division was born, although because the tractor needed weight the basic engine design was changed to cast iron. The engine applications that followed were wide: generator and compressor sets, marine, earthmoving, oilfield equipment and heavy trucks. It is rumoured that Robotham was not at all an easy man to do business with, and indeed was regarded as something of a snob. Rudston, who detested snobbery, always referred to him as Row-bottom, which suggests that the two men were not, perhaps, particularly close and is also an example of Rudston's rather quirky sense of humour.
The oil engine division must have been regarded as a very sound diversification for Rolls-Royce, since the engines were made in a power range ideally suited for the heavy construction equipment needed to rebuild Britain. However in the late 50s, it was the global rail network that was perceived as offering the best opportunity to expand the business, particularly since it provided the chance of a long term demand for profitable spare parts, possibly for up to thirty years. The Car Division had for some time been looking at the prospects for broadening the product range and had taken out a licence for Twin Disc industrial torque converters. This transmission was suitable for use behind the RR diesels in earthmoving and other industrial applications particularly shunting locomotives and diesel railcars. Discussions were held with BR Midland and two projects were launched, one of which was to replace the BUT engines in an existing design. A second more ambitious project was for RR to design and supply a complete set of equipment from driver's handle down to the axle mounted final drive. The commission to build a prototype railcar was greeted enthusiastically by the car division at Crewe, who no doubt saw the venture, if successful, as a potentially highly lucrative diversification for them as well.
The project was managed by Crewe, and the railcar (built by the Midland Carriage and Wagon Works at Litchurch Lane, Derby) completed its trials in early 1957.
In the summer of that year, responsibilities for rail transport were effectively removed from Crewe, and placed under a new Rail Transport Department, based initially at Derby, under Rudston's management. The RTD subsequently moved to Shrewsbury to occupy the old Sentinal works. Rudston's appointment was probably made by Denning Pearson, Hives' successor, and left Rudston with something of a political hot potato. Not surprisingly, Crewe were most unhappy at losing control of rail transport, and took it as a sign that Robotham did not trust them to sell his engines!
Rudston's task as RTD manager was therefore not an easy one, as he had to reconcile the products of two entirely different divisions; the diesel engines, which were made by the oil engine division at Sinfin B site, around three miles from Nightingale Road, and the transmission system, which was to be manufactured by the car division a long way away by the somewhat demoralised team at Crewe.
This raised difficulties that were more of a political than an engineering nature! The truth of the matter is that the wheel had turned full circle, and Rolls-Royce now regarded themselves primarily as aero engine manufacturers. Cars had become something of a sideline which was not even very profitable, and the very creation of the RTD had rubbed salt in the wound of their perceived secondary status. Brian Leverton, who came from Crewe to Shrewsbury to take over the department, says that both Crewe and Sinfin were pleased to participate in the venture because of its revenue-earning potential, but agrees that there were political problems. Robotham had set his heart on the chief executive's job at the car division, a job that went to a man he had recruited, Llewellyn-Smith. The atmosphere between the two men was therefore somewhat chilly.
The appointment of an old age pensioner, albeit one whose abilities were undiminished, to a position involving delicate political negotiation was quite far-sighted of Rolls-Royce. As well as being obviously the best qualified man for a rather tricky job, Rudston really had nothing to lose by this time. Rudston was going to establish Rolls-Royce as a major supplier to the railway industry. If personalities in the company weren't too keen on the idea, that was just their bad luck. There is something to be said for being 66! It must also be said that his experience with high-speed diesels in the 1930's, together with his hands-on experience with 10,100 in the 1940's made him possibly the only man in the country with the breadth of vision needed to do the job.
Prior to his appointment as manager of the Rolls-Royce RTD, Rudston had no direct involvement in the company's new venture into rail transport. However, I know he had taken a keen interest in these exciting developments, and discussed the possible outcome with his friend Rubbra, who was then engineering director of Rolls-Royce Aero. His work on 10,100 was well known to the main board, who had always supported him, albeit covertly. His own views on the future of rail transport were very clear and, indeed, had not changed much since the early 1930's. He considered that British Railways had missed the electrification boat in the late forties; costs had escalated over the years and were now prohibitive. The only way forward was a massive conversion of the network to diesel power, and here again he had strong views. He was a firm advocate of the use of multiple high-speed diesels in place of one massive engine, and for a number of reasons. Firstly, even in multiple, they tended to form a less expensive option. Secondly, they were easier to service. Thirdly, they could be distributed in the frame of the locomotive, or along the carriages of the train, so as to provide even axle loadings and therefore better traction. Fourthly, they were more likely to be mass-produced, and would therefore give no problems of parts interchangeability as well as being more reliable.
Even allowing for Rubbra's support, Rudston must have performed a brilliant sales job on the board of Rolls-Royce, who were persuaded that, since British Railways was no longer capable of manufacturing a locomotive like 10100, a private consortium might have more success. If the locomotive was successful in Great Britain., there was a great potential overseas market for the simple locomotives with the Fell diesel-mechanical transmission, since they could be serviced in developing countries by fitters with fairly basic skills.
The purpose of the RTD was, of course, to sell engines produced by the OED and, to this extent, Rolls-Royce was not initially too concerned about the type of transmission used on the locomotives they powered. However, this was to change. Competitors were beginning to offer complete engine-to-bogey packages, and RTD, who had already followed this practice for railcars, were forced to consider this approach for locomotives as well. Moreover, Rudston had always advocated the multiple use of precisely the type of engine produced by Robotham at Sinfin.
Rudston perceived two possible applications for his diesel-mechanical design: Locomotives for all duties with one, two or four engines, and multiple-unit trains with under-floor equipment. Rolls-Royce at that time would have been able to provide four-engined power units up to 1500 draw-bar horsepower, and could power 12-car multiple unit trains up to 4,500hp, a figure remarkably close to that provided by a high-speed electric train drawing its power from the national grid.
Possibly the clincher, though, was that without Rudston's design, there was a gap in the Rolls-Royce range. British Railways was at that time investing heavily in hump shunting yards, the now obsolete method of sorting out goods train according to destination from a random mix of loaded wagons. Those with long memories and the misfortune to have lived close to railway marshalling yards will remember the panting of the locomotive as it pushed a train of wagons up to the top of the hump; then the few seconds of silence while the leading wagon was uncoupled to roll downhill under gravity, until the crash as it hit its own train, a crash which was repeated down the whole length of the train as the wagons collided with each other. Then, after the sidings pointsman had reset the points as necessary, the wretched panting started all over again. This exercise could easily go on all night.
Hump shunting demands high torque at ultra-low speeds; little over a walking pace. Diesel electrics were not much good at this duty. Suitably-geared diesel hydraulics could do the job but were no use for anything else. A two-engined Fell locomotive, running on one engine, could hump shunt all night if necessary - and then be used in two-engine mode to haul the trains it had created anywhere in the country.
In return for his patents, therefore, Rudston had found a team that was not only able to build to his design but was eager to do so. Another valuable acquisition for him was the availability of the Twin Disc torque converter. It will be remembered that 10,100 owed its performance characteristics to very advanced supercharging - and British Railways were not enthusiastic about superchargers, preferring the simplicity of naturally aspirated engines. The torque converter provided the Fell design with the required 'drooping torque' characteristic in a simpler, more elegant way.
Rudston's first job was to create a suitable team, which he did by recruiting Ken Tyler, the ex-Ricardo's man who had worked on 10,100, Bernard Moultrie from Crewe and R.Hedges from the oil engine division at Sinfin. Much of the early conceptual work was done by Rudston and Bernard Moultrie, and I remember that Rudston was devastated when Moultrie was killed in 1961, in a car accident on his way from Crewe to Derby for a routine meeting. Sinfin would supply the engines, and Crewe would build the gearboxes and torque converters. Rudston began his basic design work and showed me two drawings he had produced on his little drawing board; both in pencil on tracing paper, which was always his chosen medium. One was for an 800hp shunter with only two engines; the other was a 1500hp main-line express locomotive intended as a successor to 10,100. Both had the Fell differential transmission system, christened 'Hydiff' by Rolls-Royce, and from the outside, both looked remarkably similar to the locomotives that were actually built.
He was particularly proud of his shunter, which had a 350hp Rolls-Royce engine at each end and was significant in that it could replace no less than three types of locomotive. The principles of the gearbox were very similar to those of 10,100. One engine could drive one side of the gearbox differential, the other side being locked by a substantial freewheel. This provided the low-speed, high-torque characteristics needed for hump shunting. Engaging the second engine effectively doubled the speed of the final drive, combining high torque with a top speed suitable for goods and passenger trip working. In addition to the high efficiency of the diesel mechanical system, the system ensured that the engines always operated at or near their most fuel-efficient speed and power output. The design was simple, cheap, easy to service and flexible.
Two of these multi-purpose twin-engined locomotives with Rolls-Royce engines, gearboxes and torque converters were built by the (now defunct) Yorkshire Engine Company, under the name Taurus. One was built to standard gauge and fully assessed by British Rail; the other had Spanish gauge.
A mainline locomotive was also built by the Clayton Equipment Company near Tutbury in Derbyshire, with four 350hp Rolls-Royce diesels and transmission components supplied by Crewe. It was given the code DHP1, which translated to it being the first diesel hydraulic prototype. The fledgling rail transport division was moved to Shrewsbury in 1960.
Because of the subsequent development by other manufacturers of power bogies with hydraulic motors for rail traction, this designation has obviously caused confusion to railway enthusiasts, who have assumed that DHP1 had diesel hydraulic transmission, of the type that had given so much trouble on the Western Region. In fact, it would be more accurate to describe the Fell transmission as mechanical, with sequential engagement of the engines, although system control techniques had advanced sufficiently for this to be automated. The locomotive was driven by a single conventional regulator, and a mechanical power train through to the power bogies. Her basic design differed from 10100 in only one important respect; whereas 10100 had conventional fluid couplings and derived her torque characteristics from her special supercharging, DHP1 used automotive-type torque converters made at Crewe The gearbox was also designed and built at Crewe. The bogies were made by International Combustion at Derby, the drive from the central gearbox being transmitted to them by car-type cardan shafts.
DHP1 was completed in 1963 and made several trial runs, during which a major gearbox problem (poor gear mesh in reverse) was identified and rectified at the Crewe works. Only two weeks later, the project received a monumental blow from which it never recovered. What actually happened is unclear.
In an otherwise excellent article in its October 1998 issue, Railway Magazine states that Rolls-Royce suddenly, unilaterally and without prior warning pulled out of the consortium, leaving Clayton 'holding the baby' on its own. Clayton bravely struggled on, refitting the gearbox and resuming the trials programme. It is recorded that from then on, the locomotive performed superbly - but it is a sad fact that she never hauled a revenue-earning train for British Railways. The picture shows her hauling a train of loose-coupled empty goods wagons on one of her trials, and she did do some sterling work in the sidings at International Combustion, who borrowed her for shunting purposes when their own locomotive broke down. This, though, was rather ignominious work for a 1500 horsepower main-liner.
Brian Leverton casts doubt on the Railway Magazine version of events. His memory is that, with Robotham retiring from the diesel engine division, and most particularly the failure of British Railways to take up the new locomotive, it was felt by both Claytons and Rolls-Royce that the chances of long-term success with overseas sales were slight. The decision was therefore taken mutually to terminate the project. One factor that would seem to support Brian Leverton's version of events is that, although Rolls-Royce had no direct involvement with DHP1 after 1963, the company did not call for the return of its capital equipment until the locomotive was finally broken up in 1967. Sadly, records of the rail traction division of Rolls-Royce were lost long ago, so we have no way of knowing for certain what happened. The staff who worked on the locomotive would not have been party to decisions taken behind the closed doors of the boardroom. DHP1, therefore, never even received a running number, which logically, I suppose, would have been 10101. 1963, then, was a bad year for Rolls-Royce and Clayton's.
It was also a very bad year for the country. Prime Minister MacMillan had become too ill to continue in the post, and his place had been taken by a caretaker, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, whose Conservative government was replaced by Harold Wilson and a socialist government at the General Election in 1964. The reason for the failure of these fuel-efficient, simple locomotives may therefore well have been political. In 1963, the infamous Beeching report on the railways was rushed through in a poorly thought-out policy that would replace a major part of our rail heritage with road transport. The policy was not popular with the socialists, and might well have not survived the change of government.
Although it is now clear that the government had already ratified the closure of the great majority of our branch lines, the public was told at the time that only unprofitable lines would close, and British Railways was instructed to make sure that those lines already scheduled for closure were manipulated so as to show a loss. Older readers from the south of England may remember the almost comic attempts the Southern Region made to provoke the failure of the busy little branch line which served the south downs commuter villages between the Horsham and Brighton main lines. They removed all advertising of the service long before its withdrawal, but the little tank engine with its three elegant coaches stubbornly refused to make a loss for them. In the end, they resorted to running the school specials empty during the school holidays, and that did the trick. The metals were ripped up with indecent haste, almost overnight, following withdrawal of the service, as there was a powerful commuter lobby at the time who were vociferous in their demand that the line was essential to their livelihood.
In this climate of retrenchment, British Railways were, in the main, fully occupied in withdrawing services and disposing of surplus rolling stock. They would not have been of a mind to commit to an entirely new sort of locomotive, and certainly not for branch or trip work. If Taurus and DHP1 had come along a few years earlier, the story might have been different. A few years later, and DHP1 could have been the first of a new breed of fuel-efficient locomotives hauling high-speed main-line freight. No single member of the consortium, therefore, could be blamed for the failure of the locomotive. She was simply born at the wrong time.
Although 10100 preceded DHP1, she could not really be said to have been a lesser locomotive. For one thing, she had the large-diameter driving wheels for good traction so beloved of steam lcomotive enthusiasts and that private companies like International Combustion were unable to make! Rudston himself preferred the magnificent Paxman-Ricardo engines to the Rolls-Royce engines, but I wonder whether we are seeing a little unfair prejudice here. The Rolls-Royce engines were very advanced, and represented a new generation of high-speed diesels. They certainly gave trouble at first, but went on to be used by no less than eighteen British loco manufacturers, and were exported to Australia, Canada, Finland, Norway, South Africa, Spain and Sweden. At one time, Rolls-Royce had more than half the total UK market share for high-speed diesels, so they could not have been that bad. Rolls-Royce is quick to point out that they did some very good business replacing old Paxmans with their C range products. Readers will remember that Rudston tended not to like things that he did not altogether understand, and I think his prejudice against Sinfin diesels may well be an example of this trait. Robotham certainly knew Sir Harry Ricardo, as they had served together on various tank committees during the war, and it is my understanding (through Brian Leverton) that Ricardo's had some design input to the C range.
Ken Tyler told me that the hard work and long hours he put into 10,100 and DHP1 proved to be the best possible grounding for a career in engineering.
There is no doubt that diesel-mechanical and diesel-hydraulic locomotives are viable. Locomotives of this type are still performing well, in countries like Kenya, after 20 years' service. However, by the nineteen sixties, British Rail had finally decided that the future of rail transport lay with high-speed main-liners, and that the only way to develop the very high horsepower required was electrically, with power drawn from the national grid. The new branch line passenger market was for under-floor diesel engines with mechanical or hydraulic transmissions, for use in multiple-unit trains such as Sprinters and medium-speed cross-country expresses running on non-electrified lines. History, in fact, was repeating itself again, and we were back to trains very similar to the Maybach-powered railcar that Rudston had studied in 1930! Without the proven backing of British Railways, with a fleet of diesel-mechanical main-liners to prove their service reliability, overseas sales of locomotives to the DHP1 design would have been very hard to achieve.
Rudston never abandoned his belief in diesel-mechanical transmission and, according to Brian Leverton, directed a great deal of time and effort into persuading British Railways that high-speed railcars with under-floor engines were the answer to many express services. That he was right is shown today by the existence of such excellent services as Northern Spirit's Trans-Pennine Express. We are fortunate in that Rudston, like his scientist sister Dame Honor, believed in publishing his findings for the benefit of his peers, and indeed he wrote another paper in 1960, when he was 68. Entitled Rationalising Diesel Power Equipment for Rail Traction, it summarised his experience with car-type high-speed diesel engines in railcars, and was published by the Institution of Locomotive Engineers. In a lecture given to the Sir Henry Royce Memorial Foundation jointly with Ken Tyler, Brian Leverton indicates that one of the factors that prompted Rudston to write the paper was his discovery that a mixed bunch of railway engines undergoing repair at the Stratford works at the time had power to weight ratios ranging from 7 to 24lb per unit horsepower! To an engineer from the aeronautic or automotive industries, these figures are risible and suggest that something was very wrong with British Railways' locomotive stock! His final work, the historical document on the engine repair shops at Pont de l'Arche during the first world war, forms a chapter of this book.
Rudston retired from Shrewsbury in 1960, but stayed on as a full-time consultant for another year. He then became a part-time consultant. There was an unfortunate incident at this time, when he was refused admission to Shrewsbury by the gateman. This turned out to be no more than a misunderstanding resulting from a tightening of security to prevent leakage of commercial information (Sentinel were still building RR-powered locomotives on the site) and he was welcomed into Shrewsbury on a number of subsequent occasions by Brian Leverton, his successor. However, Rudston was very cross at the time!
Rudston ended his long association with Rolls-Royce in 1962, being succeeded by consultant Brian Shepherd, who very nearly gave us gas turbine powered trains. Forty years on, Rudston's influence on our rail system is still clear to see.
We may well wonder just how much money we would have saved in diesel fuel costs had we followed the diesel-mechanical traction route in the late forties. By coincidence, 1963, the year of the Beeching cuts, the Profumo scandal and not our finest hour at all, was also the year of the Great Train Robbery.
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